Introduction
The previous incumbent of the White House, President George W. Bush, was clear in occasionally dramatic terms when he was prepared to resort to the use of force. What became known as the 'Bush doctrine' comprised of two key elements. The first sought to expand the concept of 'imminence' in regards to the right of self-defence so as to enable the United States to exercise this right by acting 'pre-emptively'.1 The second element was an attempted shift in the rules on the responsibility of states for the attacks of non-state actors so that there was to be 'no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbour … them'.2 When the doctrine was set out neither of these elements constituted a part of the jus ad bellum with the former being particularly controversial. Furthermore, as this article discusses, neither subsequently found a place lex lata within the legal regime regulating the use of force.3
Whilst since President Barack Obama took up residence in the Oval Office in 2009 there have been some notable positive shifts in policy and diplomacy, a troubling aspect of President Obama's first year in the White House has been the lack of clarity over his approach to the use of force and the permissible limits imposed by international law. This has been discernable through his response to a survey conducted by the American Society of International Law in which several questions were posed to the presidential candidates in the run-up to the elections in 2008,4 in a speech given at the West Point military academy on 1 December 2009,5 and in a speech in Oslo upon acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 2009.6
Yet arguably the simplest and most formal way to discern a particular administration's position on the use of force is by examining its National Security Strategy. Indeed, this document outlines the major national security concerns perceived by the particular administration and how it plans to tackle them. Furthermore, the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies were the closest that the Bush administration came to setting out and justifying the Bush doctrine in legal terms.7 The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the publication of this document by 15 June of a new administration,8 a deadline that President Obama failed to meet. However, he is not alone here as no administration has ever met this deadline.9
Nevertheless, on 27 May 2010 the White House published the Obama administration's first National Security Strategy.10 Whilst some within the media have questioned whether there is an 'Obama doctrine',11 this article argues that a doctrine that could be described as 'necessary force' has emerged. Indeed, the 2010 National Security Strategy provided somewhat of a (anti-)climax to the establishment of this doctrine, firmly establishing it in following on from previous speeches given by the President, whilst offering very little expansion upon its breadth and limits. Furthermore, it is argued that although many of President Obama's initial actions whilst in the White House have been commendable and witness America trying, if not always successfully,12 to move more in line with its international legal obligations, in many respects his position on the use of force, as witnessed most recently in the 2010 National Security Strategy, is more vague and open to unilateral possibilities than his predecessor's and ultimately cannot be reconciled with the contemporary limits imposed by the jus ad bellum.
In setting out these arguments, this article will be structured in the following way. It first examines in section two the notion of pre-emptive self-defence, most famously connected with the doctrine of President Bush but also apparently adopted by President Obama. Section three then looks at the 'harbouring' standard of attribution of the actions of non-state actors to states for the purposes of self-defence. This standard provided a key part of the justification for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, an operation which commenced in 2001 but which officially continues today. The Bush doctrine has been much discussed and debated elsewhere and therefore neither of these sections will revisit it in any great detail.13 However, in order to set the Obama doctrine of 'necessary force' in a comparative context these elements will be briefly set out. Section four addresses a further and distinct aspect outside of the context of self-defence which can be identified as constituting a part of the Obama doctrine, that is, the use of force for humanitarian purposes. Throughout the article in setting out how the Obama doctrine of 'necessary force' has incorporated these elements attention will be given to the place and role of necessity in each of these areas. Furthermore, the important question of whether the United States, given its 'superpower' status, has had, or indeed can have, an impact upon the rules governing the use of force, will be addressed.
The Pre-emptive Use of Force

A. The Bush Doctrine: Attempts at Widening the Concept of 'Imminence'
The first indication of the pre-emptive self-defence element of the Bush doctrine came in the justification for Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 where, in addition to responding to the ongoing threat posed by al-Qaida and the Taliban, it was stated in its letter to the UN Security Council that the United States 'may find that [its] self-defence requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other states'.14 Indeed, it was clear that on this occasion the United States was going beyond simply invoking the right of self-defence solely in regards to the perpetrator of the attacks of 11 September 2001, that is, al-Qaida, and its harbour state, Afghanistan.15 This ominous statement was given further context in the January 2002 State of the Union address (where President Bush infamously set out his 'axis of evil' comprising of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea)16 and the West Point military academy speech of June 2002, where it was stated that the United States must 'be ready for pre-emptive action' so as to 'confront the worst threats before they emerge'.17 What came to be known as the 'Bush doctrine' finally took formal shape in the 2002 National Security Strategy where it was again asserted that the United States reserved the right to exercise its 'right of selfdefence by acting pre-emptively'.18 13 See, for example, R. The discourse surrounding forcible actions in self-defence prior to an armed attack having been sustained is not clear and precise in its terminology. Indeed, the terms 'pre-emptive', 'anticipatory', and 'preventative' are 'not technical terms of art with clear meanings and they are used in different ways by different authors.'19 However, they are employed by those that use them as a means of differentiating the temporal nature of the different forms of action in self-defence. Whilst not of universal usage, perhaps the distinction most often employed in the literature and the one adopted in this article is as follows: 'anticipatory' self-defence is the most immediate form, taken in response to the threat of an armed attack which, although perhaps not yet launched, is deemed to be imminent;20 'pre-emptive' self-defence refers to action that is taken against a perceived threat of a more temporally remote nature;21 lastly, 'preventative' self-defence is a general term referring to either of the above forms.22
Although the right of self-defence is an 'inherent' one,23 by claiming the right to use force in self-defence against threats that are yet to even emerge it was clear that this was an attempt by the Bush administration to take a wide side-step around the requirement for the occurrence of an 'armed attack' before the right can be engaged, a requirement stated prominently in Article 51 of the UN Charter.24 However, whilst Article 51 contains the treaty based form of the right of self-defence, this right is also one that exists in customary international law,25 though as the International Court of Justice stated in the Nicaragua case in 1986, ' [o]n a number of points, the areas governed by the two sources of law do not exactly overlap, and the substantive rules in which they are framed are not identical in content'.26 This can be seen, for example, in that the requirement of an 'armed attack' before an action in self-defence can commence is found in Article 51 of the UN Charter, whereas the requirement that actions taken in self-defence be 'necessary' and 'proportional' emanate from customary international law.27
Nevertheless, due to the fact that there has now been over sixty years of state practice subsequent to the introduction of the UN Charter and because the addressees of the Charter and those of customary international law almost completely coincide, there has been a 'certain degree of uniformity and coherence in their respective development'.28 As such, any modifications to the right of self-defence, or changes in the context of its application, are likely to have an impact upon the interpretation and modification of both sources of the right. Furthermore, in practical terms, when discussing forcible actions a distinction is not generally made by states between the two sources.29 19 However, given the direct confrontation between the requirement for an 'armed attack' in Article 51 and the notion of pre-emptive self-defence, the 2002 Strategy avoided any reference to either this requirement or to Article 51 in general. Instead, in legally justifying the Bush doctrine, the 2002 National Security Strategy began by making reference solely to the customary form of the right of self-defence and to the way in which its limits had been interpreted by some:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threatmost often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.30
Upon the terminology noted above, it appears that it was the right of anticipatory self-defence that was being referred to in this paragraph. This right, which as the 2002 National Security Strategy duly noted has had some support from legal scholars, perhaps most notably the late Sir Derek Bowett,31 is conditioned upon the notion of an 'imminent' threat, that is, whilst an armed attack has not actually been sustained at the time that the action in self-defence is launched, the trigger has already been, or is about to be, pulled by the adversary and to wait would be to suffer certain attack. Furthermore, when the 2002 Strategy talked of this right being recognised in international law 'for centuries', this is arguably a reference back to the Caroline incident of 1837 and the requirement that emerged from the correspondence between the British and Americans that there must be 'a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.'32 Of course, at the time of the Caroline incident there was no legal prohibition of the use of force and so this requirement formed more a part of the political discourse in justifying uses of force as opposed to a formal legal justification.33
However, it was what followed in the 2002 Strategy which was of most significance. Indeed, the 2002 document went on to argue that '[w]e must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries',34 which had been identified as 'shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend '35 and 'unbalanced Although dressed up in language of 'adapting' the law to meet contemporary realities, this express attempt at modifying the jus ad bellum was in actual fact a sharp break from the accepted limits of the jus ad bellum. Indeed, in contrast to the notion of anticipatory selfdefence, that of pre-emptive self-defence has traditionally found much less support from scholars and international jurists.39 This is arguably due to the fact that whilst anticipatory self-defence and the notion of an 'imminent' armed attack can arguably, although perhaps somewhat tenuously, be temporally reconciled with Article 51's stipulation for the occurrence of an 'armed attack', pre-emptive self-defence, and its trigger constituting of the mere perception of a temporally remote, albeit serious, threat, cannot. As the Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence noted in 2005, '[a] threatened attack must be "imminent" and this requirement rules out any claim to use force to prevent a threat emerging. '40 The claim in the 2002 National Security Strategy was significant not only for the conscious argument to shift traditionally more acceptable notions of what the law permits rather than simply assert a sharp break from them41 but also, by talking of 'adapting' the traditional law, the Bush administration was recognizing that it was operating within the lex ferenda which militates against any finding of opinio juris even on behalf of the doctrine's proponent state. 42 Indeed, by asserting that states 'must adapt' the concept of imminence to the nature of today's adversaries, the United States was expressing opinio necessitatis as to the right of unilateral pre-emptive self-defence. 43 Whether this claim was to become a part of the lex lata or remain an argument lex ferenda depended upon a number of factors. Key amongst these was how it was received by other actors within the international community. Indeed, whilst the international legal system is of a decentralised and auto-interpretive nature, this does not, however, lead to the conclusion that each state can automatically interpret the shape of the law to meet its existing perceived needs and interests. This applies equally to the United States as although this state arguably holds greater de facto power than any other in terms of its political, economic, and military might, with the greater possibilities this presents for its voice and influence to be projected and felt, alongside certain forms of de jure power such as its permanent membership of the UN Security Council44 and the possession of a veto within this organ,45 this does not grant it any de jure additional powers in terms of the making and interpreting of general international law over and above those possessed by other states.
To be sure, in the context of the jus ad bellum, the notion of general agreement amongst states is of vital importance whether in terms of interpreting the UN Charter46 or modifying customary international law.47 Whilst the notion of 'specially affected' states has a place in customary international law formation and modification, this limited doctrine has been held to exist more in connection with the views of states which, for example, have a coast line when the law concerning maritime boundaries is in dispute,48 than in connection with states who are generally more powerful and/or of greater military might with increased possibilities and, perhaps, propensity to use force when the parameters of the jus ad bellum is in question. This is not to say that the 'specially affected' state doctrine will not in the future be used to provide more rights to these states in forming and modifying the jus ad bellum, but this is not currently the context of its application. As things stand, the law may be modified, or force may be used with less fear of sanctions and negative repercussions, as a result of these states' de facto power and influence, but it does not change in light of either their actions or views as a result of them being provided with the label of 'specially affected' states in connection with the use of force. Indeed, whilst the argument can be made that due to the fact that powerful states often engage more frequently in a broader range of activities they are more likely to be 'specially affected', there has been 'no indication that their special status in customary lawmaking is recognized as a matter of law.'49 Consequently, whilst the Bush administration expressly reserved the right for itself to take such action, any impact upon the jus ad bellum depended upon widespread acceptance by other actors within the international community, and particularly states, of this perceived necessity to take action in these circumstances and the attached shift in the jus ad bellum. The need for widespread agreement is particularly necessary given the often held view that the prohibition of the use of force, or at least aggressive force, is of jus cogens status and the consequent broadening, or perhaps disappearance altogether, of the prohibition that would occur if a right of pre-emptive self-defence was to find its place within the jus ad bellum.50 46 If the text of a treaty does not provide a clear interpretation the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) provides for other factors to be addressed. In particular, this includes 'any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions' (Art 31(3)(a) (emphasis added)) or 'any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation' (Art 31(3)(b) (emphasis added)). 47 In the formation and modification of customary international law the International Court of Justice has required a 'settled practice' involving 'widespread and representative participation'. [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, paras 77 and 73. However, this 'practice' and 'participation' is not restricted to physical acts, which would present more powerful states with more opportunities to form and modify customary international law. Instead, as the Court noted in the Nicaragua case, all that is required is that the legality of the practice in question should be 'shared in principle' by states. Nicaragua Case, supra n. 25, para 207. 48 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ibid, para. 74. The problem is that states rarely pronounce doctrinally on use of force issues, particularly in the abstract as was required in light of the claims in the 2002 Strategy.51 However, in this instance both states and international civil servants entered the fold and addressed the issue.52 Furthermore, in assessing whether any shifts have occurred the observations and views of the International Court of Justice and scholars are also important.53 On this occasion, the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence was exhaustively discussed and debated in the legal literature, with scholars on both sides of the debate not shy in casting their view54 and the International Court of Justice has stated its position on the right of self-defence 'to protect perceived security interests'.55 Ultimately, from the discourse that took place amongst these actors, and the evident lack of support for the doctrine, the consensus emerged that it was not one that was, or likely to become, acceptable as a right under the jus ad bellum. 56 
See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v The Netherlands)
As the Chatham House Principles succinctly stated in 2005:
To the extent that a doctrine of "pre-emption" encompasses a right to respond to threats which have not yet crystallized but which might materialize at some time in the future, such a doctrine (sometimes called "preventive" defence) has no basis in international law.57
Furthermore, the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence has not been witnessed in practice since. On the few occasions when action has been taken exhibiting the hallmarks of this particular doctrine, they have either been justified on other legal grounds58 or have been undertaken covertly.59 In either case, opinio juris for a right of pre-emptive self-defence has not been witnessed.
B. The Obama Doctrine: Incoherent Attempts at Pushing the Boundaries?
In contrast to the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies of the Bush administration, the 2010 National Security Strategy's direct reference to the use of force is confined to three short paragraphs on a single page.60 'Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and our allies' is the opening statement.61 In fact, the notion of force being 'necessary' is mentioned four times in these three paragraphs as well as in fleeting references elsewhere in the document.62 However, the Strategy does not offer any more as to what is meant by this statement or the situations when force will be deemed necessary. Nevertheless, as noted above, prior to the publication of this document the President spoke in connection with the use of force on a number of occasions. Whilst the notion of 'necessary force' holds a firm and important place in the Strategy, the prior references to this notion by the President may shed some light as to its meaning in this key document and, for the purposes of this section of the article, whether it includes the controversial right of pre-emptive self-defence, a notion which is not directly mentioned in the Strategy at any point.
The earliest, and to this day most direct, indication we have of Obama's position regarding the use of force and the legal limits imposed upon it is a response to a survey conducted by the American Society of International Law in which several questions were posed to the presidential candidates in the run-up to the elections in 2008.63 In this respect, the key question posed to the candidates was: '[w]hat views do you have regarding any legal constraints on US use of force?'64 In response, Barack Obama claimed that:
The U.S. has today and has always had the right to take unilateral military action, including the pre-emptive use of force, to eliminate imminent threats to our country and security. No nation or organization has a veto over our right of self-defense -and none ever will. In fact, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes this right of selfdefense for every nation.65
Furthermore, whilst Obama went on to recall 'the so-called Bush doctrine' and noted that '[t]he preventive use of force -in anticipation of potential threats that may not be imminentis a different matter',66 he also, and rather confusingly, was clear that '[s]ometimes, the preventive use of force may be necessary.'67 However, Obama gave no indications of what conditions might make it 'necessary' or indeed the types of threats being referred to and what his interpretation of 'imminence' was.
Given a somewhat veiled criticism of pre-emptive force, or preventive force as Obama described it,68 and the national security policy of his predecessor, whilst at the same time making it clear that it would be resorted to when 'necessary', it is arguable that this was the first signs of a broader and more vague Obama doctrine of 'necessary force' emerging. As confirmed by the recent publication of the 2010 National Security Strategy, there is nothing to suggest that President Obama has shifted from this position since taking up residence in the White House. Whilst at no point since becoming President has Obama expressly accepted the necessity of the pre-emptive use of force under international law, as he appeared to do in the ASIL survey, neither has he ruled it out. In fact, his position gives some cause for concern. 61 Ibid. 62 For example at 13 where it was stated that '[f]orce will sometimes be necessary to confront threats.' 63 See supra n. 4. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Here, in relation to the terminological distinctions adopted in this article, the President was clearly using 'preemptive' in place of 'anticipatory' and 'preventive' in place of 'pre-emptive'. However, the President was not incorrect in doing so as, as noted above, there is no universally agreed terminology firmly attached to the different forms of self-defence.
It was noted in the previous section that some of the initial elements of the Bush doctrine were set out in President Bush's speech at the West Point military academy in 2002. By contrast, Obama did not choose to use his speech at West Point on 1 December 2009 to do the same.69 Instead, in his speech, which was given over almost entirely to the war in Afghanistan, there were no direct references to when the use of force would be justified or 'necessary'.70 More significant in this respect was his speech in Oslo upon acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize on 10 December 2009 where he took the opportunity to speak 'at some length to the question that must weigh on our minds and our hearts as we choose to wage war.'71
On this occasion, President Obama was assertive in his belief 'that all nations --strong and weak alike --must adhere to standards that govern the use of force'72 and 'that adhering to standards, international standards, strengthens those who do, and isolates and weakens those who don't'.73 However, again, he was similarly assertive that he 'reserve[ed] the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend [his] nation. '74 This was affirmed in the 2010 National Security Strategy in which it was stated that '[t]he United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force.'75 Whilst on the face of it these statements, taken as a whole, are uncontroversial, and in many respects commendable, it is when one reads more into them that problems become apparent to the international lawyer.
(i) The 'standards' governing the use of force
The first of these problems was the failure to elaborate on the 'standards' that were being referred to. For example, were they of a political, moral or legal nature? If we are to assume that they were of a legal nature, talking about 'standards' in this context is meaningless unless one elaborates upon what one is referring to. Given not only the auto-interpretive and decentralised nature of the international legal system as a whole, but also that the jus ad bellum in particular 'is a notoriously uncertain area of international law',76 clarity in the choice of terminology to convey meaning is required.
More specifically, in the context of the customary international legal regulation of the right of self-defence the notion of 'necessity', which President Obama has apparently incorporated into his doctrine on the use of force, has a particular historical meaning. Indeed, the idea that force is only necessary when there is no alternative to settling a dispute can be traced back to writers such as Vattel.77 More recently, this has been referenced to the formula that emanated from the Caroline incident of 1837 as noted above, so that there must be a 'necessity of selfdefence' which is 'instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation'.78 Whilst this formula itself is seldom employed in the contemporary discourse of either states or scholars in discussing the legality of forcible actions, the notion of 'necessity'79 that emerged from it, along with that of 'proportionality',80 and some would say 'immediacy',81 is very much a part of this discourse and legal doctrine.82 Indeed, these criteria along with the requirement for the occurrence of an 'armed attack', as found in Article 51 of the UN Charter,83 form the key standards which are used to gauge the legality of uses of force in self-defence. However, the discrepancy over the precise meaning of the principles of 'necessity' and 'proportionality' in the light of the actions of states,84 along with the scope with which the 'armed attack' requirement of Article 51 of the UN Charter has been interpreted,85 and the different interpretations given to the 'inherent' nature of self-defence in the same provision,86 are illustrative of the vulnerability with which the jus ad bellum is to the proffering of subjective and differing interpretations. Without expansion, a simple claim to be adhering to 'standards' governing the use of force does not really tell us anything as to the Obama administration's perception of the legal restraints upon it. Indeed, moves such as referring to the 'standards' governing the resort to force could simply be taken as a 'sophisticated 78 The Caroline Case, supra n. 32 (emphasis added). 79 This notion, requiring that the use of force should be the only option for a state to defend itself against an armed attack, is often referenced by scholars today. See 
By contrast, although references to international law were generally in short supply during the Bush era, the Bush administration, as noted above, was more open as to the interpretation that it was giving to the standard of 'imminence' in light of the new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In this respect, President Obama's reference to the 'standards' governing the use of force needed expanding upon, especially after claiming himself that the 'new threats' of terrorism and nuclear proliferation to terrorist groups have caused the 'architecture to keep the peace', including the 'United Nations' and 'mechanisms to govern the waging of war', to 'buckle'.88 This perception of the current state of the 'architecture to keep the peace' was reaffirmed in the 2010 National Security Strategy where it was stated that 'the international architecture of the 20th century is buckling under the weight of new threats'.89
The central premise of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence was that standards had to shift to incorporate such a right due to the inadequacy of the existing limits upon selfdefence and the existing collective security mechanisms to deal with the broadly articulated threats. The 2010 National Security Strategy's reinforcement of President Obama's claim that these threats have caused these mechanisms to 'buckle' raises questions over whether his administration shares, although perhaps in a less clear and express manner, the interpretation of the Bush administration as to the contemporary standards governing the use of force. That is, that they permit, or should permit, the use of pre-emptive force when deemed necessary. In less cautious tones, Falk has claimed that '[d]espite some eloquent language it was clear that in essential respects that (sic) Obama's view of post-9/11 security imperatives was disturbingly similar to that of the Bush presidency.'90 Nevertheless, despite the concerns as to the continued viability of the current architecture and mechanisms that have been expressed in many documents published by different individuals and bodies since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the emergence of the Bush doctrine, the consensus remains both amongst the authors of these reports and the majority of states themselves that they are, whilst not perfect, capable of dealing with these threats.91 The Obama doctrine is far from clear as to the changes it is proposing in order to confront these 'new threats'. If President Obama feels that modifications to the jus ad bellum are necessary, he needs to offer a far more coherent exposition of these for consideration by the international community as well as how the jus ad bellum could/should evolve to incorporate them. As things stand, we are left pondering if any changes are being proposed and, if so, what they are, or whether the buckling that Obama has identified leaves states to interpret the standards for themselves so that force, including that of the pre-emptive kind, is acceptable when subjectively deemed to be necessary. (ii) The concept of 'necessity'
The second of the problems in connection with the Obama doctrine arises from the direct reference to the notion of 'necessity'. The 2010 National Security Strategy states that '[w]hile the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can'.92 It has been commented that 'whether any given instance of self-defence can be considered to be "necessary" is extremely difficult to assess.'93 Even so, the 'necessity' to use force is often considered to be conditional on it being resorted to as a last resort or after peaceful measures have been exhausted.94
However, whilst in the context of a prior armed attack having been sustained 'it appears that state practice is generally consistent with the desirability of pursuing peaceful means of resolving a dispute once an armed attack is over … [t] here is reluctance … to accept that the continued existence of the right of self-defence is dependent as a matter of law on so doing.'95 In other words, there is no absolute requirement under international law for the exhaustion of peaceful or other measures before force can be deemed necessary. Instead, the better view, based upon state practice, is perhaps, as noted in the Chatham House principles, that '[t]here must be no practical alternative to the proposed use of force that is likely to be effective in ending or averting the attack'.96 In this sense, the exhaustion of peaceful means 'constitutes evidence that a legal requirement has been met, not a legal requirement in itself.'97 As such, the Strategy's reference to the Obama administration only exhausting peaceful means before resorting to the use of force 'whenever [it] can' appears to be relatively uncontroversial in the context of traditional self-defence actions when an armed attack is under way, has been sustained, or perhaps where there is an imminent threat of one. This is even more so if the target of the armed attack is the territory of the state, as opposed to the target being an extraterritorial emanation of the state.98
The problem appears to be that President Obama is proposing a shift in the concept of necessity beyond the armed attack context to situations of simply confronting 'evil' actors in the world:
Evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism --it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.99
Since coming to power, President Obama's efforts in strengthening international diplomacy have been noted. Indeed, in his Oslo speech he also spoke of the need for 'engagement with repressive regimes',100 rhetoric that is to be welcomed. However, given the controversy surrounding President Bush's invocation of an 'axis of evil',101 the fact that Obama chose to characterize any as 'evil' is perhaps somewhat surprising. Of more significance is that it appears to be asserted that in the face of adversaries that can be categorized as such, a dilution 92 2010 NSS, supra n. 10, 22. 93 Green, supra n. 20, 86. 94 See supra n. 79 and related text. 95 Gardam, supra n. 79, 153 96 See Wilmshurst (Chatham House Principles), supra n. 40, 966 (emphasis added). 97 Green, supra n. 20, 84. 98 A distinction made by Green, ibid, 80-85. 99 Oslo speech, supra n. 6 (emphasis added). 100 Oslo speech, ibid. 101 See supra n. 16 and related text. of the standard of 'necessity' in international law is required so that in confronting such actors not only is there no longer any requirement for a prior 'armed attack', or one that is imminent, but also that in the context of 'evil' actors, whether of a state or non-state nature, 'nonviolent' measures have been pre-determined to be of no use thus opening the door to preemptive force.102
Whilst President Bush at least hung the necessity for pre-emptive self-defence on serious, if not imminent, broadly articulated threats, President Obama seems to have rested the necessity for such action more simply on the presence of 'evil' adversaries. Indeed, although the Bush doctrine stretched the notion of imminence beyond breaking point, the Obama doctrine appears to have disregarded it completely. There can be little argument against defining both the Nazi and al-Qaida ideologies as general threats to civil society. But to base the necessity of the use of force upon the highly subjective categorization of 'evil', and before a concrete forcible threat from such actors has even become discernable, destroys the basis for any prohibition of the use of force and can only lead the international community down the road towards anarchy.
In these circumstances, a practical alternative to the use of force does not simply mean 'negotiations', as Obama appears to believe. Instead, this should include resort to the UN Security Council for either action of a non-forcible nature103 or, if the will is present within this organ, for those of a forcible nature.104 As Gardam has pointed out, 'the need to establish that a forceful response is necessary is more onerous in the case of preventative action than in the case of a response to an armed attack. Not only would the futility of peaceful means to remove the threat need to be demonstrated but also that the threat is real.'105 Indeed, only if these measures have been exhausted, and with the threat having been demonstrated to be a real and serious one, as opposed to the subject of any proposed action in self-defence simply being of an 'evil' nature, could any claim to pre-emptive self-defence even begin to take on any cogency.
In any case, whilst the notion of anticipatory self-defence, as set out above, is one that has traditionally had some,106 and is arguably beginning to find more,107 support within the international community, pre-emptive self-defence, whether against terrorist networks or rogue states, is not.108 This is not to say that this could not change if, for example, Obama was to employ more subtle and acceptable means than those of his predecessor, and those which so far he has used himself, to persuade others within the international community that such action is necessary under certain circumstances. But unlike President Bush in the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies, President Obama in the 2010 Strategy has not even However, in the same letter to the Security Council it was asserted that this action would include forcible measures not just against the actual perpetrators of the attacks, al-Qaida, but also against Afghanistan, the state in which the perpetrators were located. Indeed, the letter stated that the action would 'include measures against al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. '112 In fact, when force was actually launched, it was directed mostly against the governmental infrastructure of this particular state as opposed to against the terrorist organization which had actually perpetrated the attacks.113 This was the case despite the fact that the United States did not claim that the Taliban were guilty of anything more than passively supporting the attacks carried out by alQaida: 'The attacks on 11 September 2001 … have been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation'.114 Furthermore, the exhaustion of non-forcible responses in an attempt to end this passive support was asserted: 'Despite every effort by the United States and the international community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its policy'.115
In one respect this claim was uncontroversial. Indeed, although the right of self-defence has traditionally been interpreted as excluding measures in response to attacks undertaken by nonstate entities,116 this is not actually stated in the UN Charter or in customary international law. Although Article 51 requires an 'armed attack' against a member of the UN before the right of self-defence becomes operational nothing is mentioned in regards to the entity from which such an attack must emanate from and thus the permissible target of any self-defensive measures in response. 117 In theory, so long as a response, taken in the context in which it arises, is necessary, proportionate and immediate, there is nothing in this provision to prevent a state from carrying out an act of self-defence in response to an attack regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.118
However, the non-state actors which carry out terrorist attacks are normally found on the territory of a state and 'if one would accept that private attacks can in themselves amount to "armed attacks" in the sense of article 51 of the Charter, this would lead to the absurd result that states would be exposed to military force, even if they have not committed an internationally wrongful act of their own.'119 Consequently, forcible responses on the territory of a state have traditionally only been permissible if the actions of the non-state entities can be attributed to the territorial state.120
Nevertheless, there is a distinction to be made between the establishment of a link between the non-state entity and the territorial state where it is located which is sufficient to justify the necessity of forcible action solely against the non-state entity, although in violation of the host state's territorial sovereignty, and the establishment of a link which is sufficient to justify the necessity of forcible action against both the non-state entity and the territorial state itself.
In this respect, the link required for self-defence to become permissible in the former scenario has been said to be formed 'where a state is unable or unwilling to assert control over a terrorist organization located in its territory'.121 Consequently, 'the state which is a victim of the terrorist attacks would, as a last resort, be permitted to act in self-defence against the terrorist organization in the state in which it is located',122 but not take action targeted towards the territorial state itself. Indeed, this link actually intends to show that no other means are available for it to defend itself against the non-state actors. In other words, the harbouring state's responsibility is invoked in order to conform with the condition of necessity of the law of self-defence, which indeed requires … that any action in self-defence be taken only as a last resort.123
There are many examples of states invoking the right of self-defence in responding forcefully to the attacks of non-state actors which are located in, or passively supported by, another state, although the infrastructure of the state where the actors have been located has not been the target of the forcible actions. For example, not long before 11 September 2001, in response to the bombing in 1998 of the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the United States carried out air strikes on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan and a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan.124 Whilst these strikes in response occurred within the territories of these states, the United States did not target its response towards the states themselves, but rather towards the 'terrorist facilities' located on their soil, despite accusations that these states had refused to 'shut down and to cease their cooperation with the Bin Laden organization'. 125 As an earlier example, in striking the PLO headquarters in Tunisia in 1985 Israel did not strike Tunisian state infrastructure. Instead, on this occasion Israel, in justifying its actions, claimed that whilst Tunisia 'knowingly harboured the PLO and allowed it complete freedom of action in planning, training, organizing and launching murderous attacks from its soil …[i]t was against [the PLO] that our action was directed, not against their host country. '126 In the context of Operation Enduring Freedom, it appears that the Bush administration was claiming that the Taliban were 'unable or unwilling' to cease its passive support for al-Qaida. Yet it went further than targeting its action merely against al-Qaida and instead, as noted above, employed most force against the Taliban and the state of Afghanistan. For this type of action to have become permissible, more was required in terms of the attribution of the actions to the territorial state. In this case, the traditional standard used for attributing the actions of non-state entities to states for the purposes of self-defence against the state itself is one of 'effective control',127 that is, if the entity is 'sent by or on behalf of a state',128 the entity is acting 'on the instruction of, or under the direction or control of a state',129 or the territorial state 'acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own'.130 This standard would not arguably have been satisfied in the context of the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaida and, in any case, was not asserted by the Bush administration.
Nevertheless, it was clear that after the attacks of 11 September 2001 President Bush, as part of the Bush doctrine, attempted to widen the scope of permitted response in self-defence in his newly pronounced 'war on terror' by claiming that the United States would now make 'no distinction between the terrorists who commit[] these acts and those who harbour them',131 this assimilation thus permitting it to take measures not just against terrorist training camps and facilities but also against the 'harbouring' state where they are located and which is, perhaps, unable or unwilling to end the presence of the terrorists on its soil. Indeed, this was the basis upon which Operation Enduring Freedom was launched. This standard of attribution was then given a formal place in the Bush doctrine of self-defence nearly a year later when it was stated by the Bush Administration in the 2002 National Security Strategy that '[w]e make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them',132 distinguishing the provision of aid from the mere harbouring of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks as both permitting the right of self-defence against the state concerned. As opposed to the pre-emptive self-defence arguments in the Strategy,133 there were no arguments made in an attempt to shift the contemporary limits of the jus ad bellum so as to incorporate the 'harbouring' standard of attribution. Indeed, in connection with this part of the Bush doctrine, there were no indications that the Bush administration believed that its 'harbouring' standard was lex ferenda.
However, this difference in the structure and nuance of the legal claims was arguably due to the reception that Operation Enduring Freedom had received. Indeed, when the 'harbouring' standard of attribution was relied upon after 11 September 2001 in attacking Afghanistan itself, it appeared to be generally, some might argue overwhelmingly, accepted by others within the international community.134 The agreement required for a change in the jus ad bellum appeared to be present at this point.135 For example, not only did the UN Security Council recognize the right of self-defence in this instance,136 but the general support for an action in self-defence to incorporate the Taliban and the state of Afghanistan appeared strong with very few states dissenting.137 At first glance this appeared to be a significant shift in the law governing the attribution of the actions of non-state actors to states for the purposes of self-defence. sympathy and support for the United States at this particular time, or simply fear for one's own safety, for the rules under consideration to go through a process of modification it should be demonstrated that there has been a settled practice involving widespread and representative participation which, whilst not requiring the actual physical practice of other states, is consistently shared in principle by them.140 As such, whilst there was undoubtedly opinio necessitatis generated in these arguably never to be repeated circumstances, it is only after the dust has well and truly settled that one is able to discern if this has solidified into opinio juris in connection with the potential changes to the jus ad bellum regarding forcible responses to terrorist actors and their harbour states.141 As Kohen correctly points out:
If the will of the international community is to review the existing rules regarding the use of force against terrorists, then one can expect the same attitude will be taken in other, similar situations. If it is not the case, then one has to conclude that what we are witnessing here is not a change in the rule or its interpretation, but rather a political attitude on the part of the majority of states supporting in one case only the political aims of one state.142
Indeed, if there has been no subsequent repetition of the invocation of the harbouring standard of attribution 'in other, similar situations' then it is possible to argue that this is an implicit rejection of it. In this light, upon further examination it is clear that the standard has not been invoked by the United States on a separate occasion since, or witnessed in the practice of either other states143 or the Security Council,144 or been given support in the jurisprudence of either the International Court of Justice145 or scholars,146 thus militating against any serious claims that it is now a part lex lata of the jus ad bellum.
Given this absence of the standard from the practice and discourse of these actors, but with equally no express rejection of it, Gray is perhaps correct to conclude that it is not yet entirely clear whether the events of 11 September 2001 including the subsequent invocation of the harbouring standard of attribution by the United States 'have brought about a radical and lasting transformation of the law of self-defence or whether their significance should be narrowly construed in that Operation Enduring Freedom was essentially a one-off response to 140 See supra n. 47. 141 Despite this particular standard of attribution not having found a place, at least not yet, within the lex lata, President Obama has chosen not to disassociate himself from it. On the contrary, if anything, he has offered an endorsment of it. For example, in the President's speech at the West Point military academy in December 2009 it was noted that 'Al Qaeda's base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban'.148 The President went on to indicate that whilst the Taliban and the state of Afghanistan did not carry out the attacks, or send or control those that did, this did not prevent the use of force against it. Indeed, not only did Obama recall the fact that 'Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who harbored them --an authorization that continues to this day',149 but also that '[t]he world rallied around America after the 9/11 attacks, and continues to support our efforts in Afghanistan, because of the horror of those senseless attacks and the recognized principle of self-defense.'150 In further linking the pieces together it appears that Obama has incorporated the harbouring standard under his doctrine of 'necessary force' by his categorization of this conflict as a 'war of necessity'.151
The harbouring standard of attribution presents the possibility of a radical shift in the permissible responses to terrorist attacks. The threat to international peace and security posed by widespread acceptance of this standard is clear with many states becoming possible targets of force. In this respect it opens up the possibility for far greater numbers of civilian deaths. Furthermore, whilst such a standard may have been workable against a governmental structure such as the Taliban, its utility, effectiveness and popularity should perhaps be doubted against those of a more established, legitimate, and powerful nature.
Nevertheless, although the Bush administration did not refine its proposed standard any further into a more coherent, and perhaps acceptable, regime for attribution, Obama has not only not taken the opportunity to do so but also neither officially endorsed the standard in the 2010 National Security Strategy. Whether or not this is due to recognition of its doubtful position within the contemporary jus ad bellum is unclear. However, as noted above, Obama was clear in the 2010 Strategy that '[t]he United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend [its] nation and [its] interests, yet [it] will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force'.152 Given that this was an assertion to the effect that the United States 'must' use force when necessary, but will merely 'seek' to adhere to the applicable standards, presumably including the 'effective control' standard of attribution described above, this does, after the apparent endorsement of the harbouring standard, leave a large amount of ambiguity over his position. Indeed, if Obama is willing to resort to this standard of attribution in other contexts and situations, it is still not clear the exact level of state support that will be sufficient before it is invoked as necessary under the Obama doctrine. In any case, as Kohen has remarked, '[h]arbouring terrorist groups acting abroad clearly constitutes a threat to international peace and security, which in turn can justify 147 See Gray, supra n. 19, 194. 148 West Point speech, supra n. 5 (emphasis added). 149 Ibid. See supra n. 131. 150 Oslo speech, supra n. 6 (emphasis added) 151 forcible action as decided upon by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter'.153 As part of the doctrine of 'necessary force', this factor should be taken into account in any determinations as to the necessity of forcible measures, following, but certainly in the absence of, a prior armed attack.
Ultimately, what is clear from the 2010 Strategy is that the war against al-Qaida and the Taliban has the full support of the Obama administration. Combining this with the statements from the President noted above would appear to place this standard in the armoury of weapons he is willing to use in the future, regardless of its doubtful position lex lata under the jus ad bellum. Indeed, if it is deemed 'necessary' to resort to force by the Obama administration, the contemporary standards governing when force can be resorted to have officially been made a side issue. Whilst it awaits to be seen whether this standard will be invoked by the Obama administration, as clearly it has reserved the right to do so, it can only be hoped that the practice by other actors within the international community at least follows the trend that has been witnessed so far and continues to be dismissive of any shifts in the jus ad bellum so as to incorporate it.
Humanitarian Intervention and 'Just War'
Breaking away from self-defence, there appears to be another piece to the Obama doctrine, that is, the use of force that is 'not only necessary but morally justified. ' 154 The concept of 'just war' dates back centuries and long before the current legal regulation of the use of force was born.155 However, the historical basis of this concept did not elude President Obama who noted that 'for most of history, this concept of "just war" was rarely observed'.156 Indeed, in his Nobel Prize speech the President, whilst omitting to mention the necessity of a 'just cause' or 'legitimate authority', noted the just war concept as 'suggesting that war is justified only when certain conditions were met: if it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense; if the force used is proportional; and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence. '157 In the context of his invocation of just war, Obama went on to claim that 'wars within nations' had also caused the original architecture to 'buckle'158 and that this state of affairs required the international community to think 'in new ways about the notions of just war and the imperatives of a just peace.'159 Indeed, '[m]ore and more, we all confront difficult questions about how to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region.'160 Thus Obama appeared to be suggesting that whilst the just war doctrine once existed as a means for states to justify their forcible actions this doctrine should be revived and adapted so as to be of use in justifying actions to prevent humanitarian crises within states. As he noted, a starting point in this endeavour would be to consider when force would be necessary, or as he put it 'waged as a last resort', or if it could be used in 'self-defence'.
Under the contemporary general prohibition of the threat or use of force there exists only the express exceptions of self-defence and authorization by the UN Security Council. 161 As described in the above sections of this article, the concept of necessity has a firm place in the context of self-defence,162 whilst in resorting to forcible measures under Article 42 of the UN Charter, the Security Council should first 'consider that [non-forcible] measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate'. 163 However, although some have controversially made the argument that the intervention in civil wars and humanitarian intervention can lawfully take place under the right of self-defence as a 'defence of others',164 beyond saving the lives of nationals of the intervening state selfdefence does not have an accepted role lex lata in this context.165 Furthermore, whilst the UN Security Council has come to authorize the use of force for such humanitarian purposes,166 given that Article 2(7) of the UN Charter prohibits interference with the domestic affairs of states it has had to justify these authorizations upon the basis that the incidents involved threats to international peace and security and were not wholly domestic in nature, even if for all intents and purposes this appeared to be the case.167
In the UN Charter era, and under the general prohibition of the use of force, the 'just war' doctrine has been replaced with debate around the possible emergence of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.168 Nevertheless, there is no basis within the Charter to make the case for the legality of unilateral forcible measures to prevent 'wars within nations' and humanitarian catastrophes.169 Furthermore, whilst there were arguable precedents for the emergence of a doctrine in customary international law with India's intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971,170 Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia (Kampuchea) in 1978-79,171 and Tanzania's intervention in Uganda in 1979,172 ultimately these were justified on other grounds such as self-defence, thus limiting their precedential value. Although some have argued that these interventions could have or should have been justified as humanitarian intervention this does not equate to opinio juris on the part of the acting states themselves.173
More recently was NATO's Operation Allied Force to stop the Serbian ethnic cleansing of the Kosovan Albanians in the province of Kosovo.174 This may have been the high point for some in their arguments regarding a doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention but still very few of the acting states, including the United States itself, justified it clearly as such and there has been many misgivings since about its legality, despite many perceiving it as a legitimate use of force.175 Furthermore, whilst the notion of a 'responsibility to protect' has taken its place within international legal discourse,176 this has not been interpreted as being enforceable unilaterally177 and, in any case, the realities and limitations of such a responsibility in practice have been well witnessed in Darfur.178
Nevertheless, President Obama was open in his belief not that he would like to see a principle emerge permitting the unilateral use of force on humanitarian grounds, but that:
force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That's why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.179
After claiming that the international community would have to 'think in new ways' and 'more and more' about how to prevent humanitarian catastrophes through just wars, President Obama appears here to have put the cart before the horse in claiming that such action can already be justified. Of course, this may have been in terms of action being 'morally' justified and, as such, perhaps a claim lex ferenda, but there is some confusion on this point as such envisaged interventions were placed squarely within the doctrine of 'necessary force' in the 2010 National Security Strategy: 'Military force, at times, may be necessary … to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis.'180 Consequently, it appeared that Obama was going beyond any claims lex ferenda in stating that, despite where the law currently stood, force would be used if it was deemed by the Obama administration to be necessary. Indeed, the President was clear that whilst the United States would 'seek' to adhere to standards that govern the use of force, it 'must' still reserve the right to act unilaterally 'if necessary'. 181 As discussed above, the international legal standards governing the use of force do not currently permit the unilateral use of force for humanitarian purposes. Despite this prohibition, Obama has quite clearly stated that his determination as to the necessity of forcible means will take precedence over any prohibition which it merely seeks to adhere to.
Proposing that a right should emerge is one thing, and indeed can form a constructive contribution to the development of international law, but claims that one already exists, or worse still, that action can be taken if deemed necessary regardless, is another. Indeed, this demonstrates insensitivity to, and more likely a total disregard for, the legal limits imposed by the contemporary jus ad bellum. Any claims that force can be justified purely on moral grounds sweeps aside the prohibition of the use of force and the accepted contemporary exceptions to this.
Furthermore, whilst President Obama has made overtures to multilateralism and the standards governing the use of force, not only did the President not mention the collective security system in place within the UN Charter in his speeches but appeared to intentionally avoid referring to it in the context of humanitarian interventions by stating that these actions would take place either 'individually or in concert'.182 Actions taken 'in concert' but not under the auspices of the UN Security Council possess no more legality than those taken individually. Without the Security Council's authorization or agreement this is still a unilateral use of force prohibited under the jus ad bellum as it currently stands. This controversial aspect of the 'necessary force' doctrine was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy where it was stated that '[w]hen force is necessary … we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.'183 As discussed above, the use of force for humanitarian purposes does not hold a place lex lata within the jus ad bellum and, as such, the concept of necessity is not one that has been developed in connection with it. However, given Obama's reference to the just war condition of 'last resort', the 'new way' in which Obama claimed we should view this concept must be through the lens of the contemporary international framework for peace and security. This view provides that outside of the context of self-defence simply acting in concert but without the authorisation of the UN Security Council is unlawful. Furthermore, if there is time to 'seek broad international support', then, as a last resort, there is time to go to the Security Council and seek authorization before any action becomes legally justifiable. In this respect, it was noticeable that NATO was apparently given priority over the UN Security Council in its discussions as to the institutions that the United States intends to work with (and, notably, not within).
Overall, President Obama was unclear as to what his position exactly is. In some respects he appears to be making a call to unilateral action in situations of humanitarian emergency whilst in others he appears to think that a right to take action in such circumstances already exists or, if it does not, that the doctrine of 'necessary force' permits it to override the prohibition of the use of force. Although there are arguments to be made in favour of a doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention, there are equally many concerns regarding one, concerns which have ultimately prevented a doctrine from emerging within the jus ad bellum. Whilst the prospects for such a right under the jus ad bellum are not bright, the manner in which such a right has been placed within the Obama doctrine of 'necessary force' does not appear to have furthered them, at least not in any clear and coherent way.
Conclusion
182 Oslo speech, supra n. 6 (emphasis added). 183 2010 NSS, supra n. 10, 22.
